The Diversity Justification for Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Is Hopwood v. Texas Right by Inouye, Michelle M.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 11
Issue 1 Symposium on Race and the Law Article 17
April 2014
The Diversity Justification for Affirmative Action in
Higher Education: Is Hopwood v. Texas Right
Michelle M. Inouye
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michelle M. Inouye, The Diversity Justification for Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Is Hopwood v. Texas Right, 11 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 385 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol11/iss1/17
THE DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATION FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
IS HOPWOOD v. TEXAS RIGHT?
MICHELLE M. INOUYE*
[I]t is not too much to say that the "nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure" to
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of
many peoples.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The University of California, 1996. The Board of Regents
voted to eliminate race as a factor in admissions to California's
prestigious nine-campus, 162,000-student university system.2 In
response, state democratic legislators threatened to cut funding,
and university officials expressed fear for their safety on campus.3
Both the chancellors of the University of California (U.C.) flag-
ship schools, U.C. Berkeley Chancellor Chang-Lin Tien and
UCIA Chancellor Charles E. Young, opposed banning affirma-
tive action in admissions. Chancellor Tien cited the value of stu-
dent body diversity as the main reason why race should be taken
into account during the admissions process.4 Yet U.C. officials
admitted that affirmative action, on the individual applicant
* BA., 1993, University of Southern California; J.D. Candidate, 1997,
Notre Dame Law School; ThomasJ. White Scholar, 1995-97. The author thanks
Professor John H. Robinson, Todd A. Miller, Allison B. Smith, Angelo
Lombardo, and Christine Anne Kexel for their assistance with this article.
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (Powell,
J., opinion) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
2. Two proposals will take effect Jan. 1, 1997. The first measure
eliminates the use of "race, religion, gender, color, ethnicity or national origin"
as criteria in admissions decisions. The second measure eliminates the same
criteria in hiring and contracting decisions. Dave Lesher & Amy Wallace, UC
Vote to End Affirmative Action Echoes Across U.S., LA. TIMES, July 22, 1995, at 1A.
3. Id.
4. "[H]elping minority students may not be the most compelling reason
for preserving affirmative action .... When there are diverse students, staff and
faculty... everybody stands to gain." Chancellor Chang-Lin Tien, A Viwwflom
Ber*ey, N.Y. TmExs, Mar. 31, 1996, at 4A. The presumption that a diverse
student body contributes to the educational experience of all the students is not
new. The president of Princeton University and the Harvard College
Admissions Program made the same argument in Bakk 438 U.S. at 312-13 n.48,
321-24.
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level, made it easier for a qualified minority than a qualified
white to attend a U.C. school.5
Regent Ward Connerly, sponsor of the proposal to eliminate
affirmative action, defended his proposal by saying, "We cannot
allow the desire for diversity to overshadow the need for the best-
qualified students."6 But what makes one candidate more "quali-
fied" than another? Is it solely a mix of GPA and SAT scores?
Or, does it also include achievements in athletics, proficiency in
languages, extracurricular activities, community service, legacy
status, and the ability to overcome economic or social disadvan-
tage? Universities have a myriad of admissions criteria available
to define the concept "qualified" applicant. The question is,
does the Constitution allow race to be included as one of the
criteria?
The affirmative action debate is nothing new to the halls of
higher education. The educational setting has traditionally been
considered a special context, as the unanimous opinion in Brown
v. Board of Education noted: "Education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments."7 In Bakke,
Justice Powell reinforced the unique place of higher education
by noting a First Amendment concern when the right of a univer-
sity to select its student body is impinged.8 The diversity ration-
ale for affirmative action, first voiced by Justice Powell in Bakke,
5. For example, the mean grade-point average for entering freshmen at
U.C. Berkeley differed by ethnicity for the entering class of 1994-95. The mean
GPA was 3.4 for blacks; 3.7 for Hispanics; 3.8 for whites; and 3.9 for Asians.
This excludes special admits based on athletic or musical talent. Evan Thomas
& Bob Cohn, California Forecast: Storm on Campus, NEwswEE, June 26, 1995, at
20. See also Michael Lynch, Affirmative Action at the University of California, 11
NoTRE DAMEJ.L. Ear-ncs & PuB. POL\' xx (1997).
6. Thomas & Cohn, supra note 5, at 20.
7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court also
noted:
[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.
Id.
8. Bakk 438 U.S. at 312-13. Justice Powell put it this way-
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment.... Thus, in arguing that its universities must be
accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the
most to the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes a
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment.
Id. at 313.
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assumes that there is something special about the interaction
between diverse students that adds to the "robust exchange of
ideas" at an institution of higher education.9
Despite its special character, however, higher education is
not exempt from equal protection analysis. According to Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, in order to be constitutional any race-
based classification must pass the strict scrutiny test, regardless of
its alleged purpose.1° The strict scrutiny test consists of two parts:
(1) the race-based categorization must serve a compelling state
interest; and (2) the program must be narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.1" The purpose of strict scrutiny is "to 'smoke out'
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly sus-
pect tool." '
Institutions of higher education usually proffer two justifica-
tions for their race-based admissions preferences: remedying the
present effects of past discrimination and creating a diverse stu-
dent body."3 A remedial purpose, if properly evidenced and con-
structed, will pass strict scrutiny." The diversity justification,
however, is highly controversial. Its proponents cite the freedom
of universities to choose their own students, the inherent value of
a diverse student body, the dispelling of racial stereotypes, the
addition of minority viewpoints to the "robust exchange of
ideas," and the university's First Amendment right to select its
student body."5 Opponents of the diversity justification cite the
negative effects of using race as a proxy for diverse characteris-
tics, the stigma it places on minority students, and the impact
9. "[The school] must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
10. Id. at 291.
11. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
12. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality decision).
13. Justifications that the Supreme Court rejected include reducing the
deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the medical
profession; countering the effects of societal discrimination; increasing the
number of physicians who will practice in minority communities currently
under served; lessening of social stigma; and providing faculty role models. See
Bakk 438 U.S. at 294-95, n.34; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986).
14. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
15. See generally Anthony Lewis, Handcuffs on Learning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 1996 (arguing that minority students do in fact have distinct life experiences
and therefore diverse viewpoints that they can contribute to the university);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 H v. L. Rxv. 78 (1986) (suggesting alternative rationales for a diversity
affirmative action justification).
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affirmative action has on innocent, individual applicants.' 6 The
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the diversity justifica-
tion for affirmative action in higher education constitutes a com-
pelling state interest.
This Note assesses the constitutionality and the prudence of
using racial preferences in an admissions process based on the
diversity justification. Diversity has an intrinsic value in the con-
text of higher education not only for the minority student but for
the whole of the student body, and therefore diversity should
constitute a valid justification for a race-based admissions process
in the context of higher education. Nevertheless, this Note con-
cludes that race-based admissions schemes are not narrowly tai-
lored to serve the compelling institutional interest in diversity,
and therefore current admissions practices that use race as a
"plus" factor should fail the strict scrutiny test.
Part II of this Note discusses Hopwood v. Texas in which the
Fifth Circuit held that diversity is not a valid compelling state
interest upon which a race-based admissions program may be
based. I will critique Hopwood in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Adarand v. Pena and the subsequent district
and circuit court cases. Part III addresses the Hopwood decision
from an ethical stand point, analyzing the value of diversity in
higher education and the moral desirability of using race as a
proxy for diversity. Part IV discusses alternative admissions crite-
ria that promote a school's interest in gaining and maintaining a
diverse student body. This Note concludes that these alternatives
are not only constitutional but are more ethical and principled
than race-based affirmative action.
II. Hopwooo v. xAs. DID THE FrFm CiRcurr INTERPRET AND
APPLY THE LAW ComRETLY?
In Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit held that the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School had violated white applicants' rights
under the Equal Protection Clause by giving a substantial racial
preference to specified minorities in its admissions process.
Rejecting diversity as ajustification for the minority preferences,
the Fifth Circuit stated that "there is essentially only one compel-
ling state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying past
wrongs." 17
16. See STEPHEN L. CARTEit, REFLEMCONS OF AN AFFIVmATI ACTION BABY
(1991).
17. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d
932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
DIVWSTY JUST1ICATION
A. Supreme Court Precursors to Hopwood
The Supreme Court has twice ruled on diversity as ajustifica-
tion for classifications based on race; the outcomes of both are
equivocal. The diversity justification for affirmative action first
appeared in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, a higher education admissions case decided by
a fractured Supreme Court. This issue appeared for a second
time in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission.18
The Bakke decision consisted of six opinions, with no major-
ity. Justice Powell announced the Court's judgment that strict
scrutiny applied even to "benign" classifications based on race.
He was joined on that issue by Justices Burger, Stewart, Stevens,
and Rehnquist. Then Justice Powell, joined by justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, reversed the California Supreme
Court's injunction preventing the U.C. Davis Medical School
from according any consideration to race in its admissions pro-
cess.1 9 Justice Powell, as the necessary swing vote for both issues,
wrote the lead opinion that has been widely cited and accepted
as law.2" Yet no otherJustice joined Powell's concurrence which
contained his finding that student body diversity constituted a
compelling state interest, a point later exploited by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Hopwood v. Texas.2
Justice Powell wrote, "the attainment of a diverse student
body.., clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an insti-
tution of higher education."2" A university that promoted diver-
sity "must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission."" In
explaining why diversity was of such importance, Justice Powell
first cited the essential freedom of a university to "make its own
judgments as to education includ[ing] the selection of its student
body."24 Justice Powell thus placed the right of a university to
select students that it believes will contribute most to the
exchange of ideas under the protection of First Amendment. 5
Justice Powell next focused on the benefits derived from a
diverse student body, for minority and non-minority students
18. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978).
20. Se Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analyis, 67 CAL. L.
REv. 69 (1979) (Justice Powell's "tie breaking opinion ... has acquired wide
pragmatic appeal.")
21. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 941-44.
22. Bakke 438 U.S. at 311-12.
23. Id. at 313.
24. Id. at 312.
25. Id. at 313.
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alike. Students learn informally when they come into contact
with individuals who hold varying viewpoints and have had differ-
ent life experiences. This informal learning, though difficult to
quantify, is of great value, and " [t] he atmosphere of 'speculation,
experimentation and creation' ... is widely believed to be pro-
moted by a diverse student body." 6 Justice Powell found this
benefit in undergraduate, graduate, law," and medical schools,
adding that diversity of backgrounds enriched the students'
training and better equipped them to serve a heterogeneous
population.
After Justice Powell had determined that diversity consti-
tuted a compelling state interest in higher education, he turned
to the narrowly tailored requirement For diversity to pass the
narrowly tailored portion of the strict scrutiny test, race must be
one characteristic, one "plus" factor, among many considered by
the university."8 Justice Powell suggested other qualifications a
university could consider, including: "exceptional personal tal-
ents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential,
maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming dis-
advantage, [and the] ability to communicate with the poor
.... "I This wide range of "plus" factors allowed for an individu-
alized comparison of each minority and non-minority applicant
on a case-by-case basis, thus satisfying an individual's right not to
be precluded from a certain seat by virtue of their race.a Under
26. Id. at 312.
27. Ironically, Justice Powell cited Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634
(1950) for this proposition. That case dealt with the University of Texas School
of Law's practice of racial segregation. Justice Powell included this excerpt
from Sweatt:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice,
cannot be effective insolation from the individuals and institutions
with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed
from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the
law is concerned.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (quoting Sweat, 339 U.S. at 634).
28. Justice Powell put it succinctly:
Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogenous student body. Although a university must have wide
discretion in making sensitive judgments as to who should be
admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may
not be disregarded.
Bakke 265 U.S. at 314.
29. Id. at 317.
30. Justice Powell explained what he meant by a "plus" factor.
In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be
deemed a "plus" in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate
DAERS1Y JUSTFICATION
this "plus" factor analysis, Justice Powell found that although the
U.C. Davis Medical School had a compelling interest in student
body diversity, the school's set-aside program was unconstitu-
tional because it was not narrowly tailored to further diversity.
U.C. Davis's set-aside program was not narrowly tailored because
it insulated the individual from comparison with all other candi-
dates for any available seat, and failed to treat "each applicant as
an individual in the admissions process."31 Thus, U.C. Davis's
racial classifications "focused solely on ethnic diversity, [which]
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diver-
sity.""2 U.C. Davis's rigid set-aside system, found unconstitu-
tional, gave way to the narrowly tailored alternative: the Bakke
minority "plus" factor. Despite the fact that Justice Powell did
not speak for the majority of the Supreme Court, schools have
used his "plus" factor in their admissions programs ever since.
The second, and only other time, that the Supreme Court
directly discussed the diversity justification was in Metro Broadcast-
ing v. Federal Communications Commission.a In Metro Broadcasting,
a non-minority bidder for a broadcast license challenged FCC
policies favoring minority bidders, including "distress sale" guide-
lines that allowed transfer of existing radio and television stations
exclusively to minority controlled firms.' Citing judicial defer-
ence to congressional legislation,Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, used intermediate scrutiny instead of the strict scrutiny
standard used in Bakke to judge the constitutionality of the FCC
polices. 5 Under intermediate scrutiny he found that diversity
served an "important government interest:"36
[T]he interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the
very least, an important government objective and is there-
the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats. The file of a particular black applicant may be
examined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor
of race being decisive....
Id Justice Powell cited Harvard College's program as an example of how this
might work. Id. at 321-24.
31. Id. at 318.
32. Id. at 315.
33. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (the application of intermediate scrutiny to
congressional programs was later rejected by the Court in Adarand).
34. Id. at 547.
35. For the FCC's policies to pass intermediate scrutiny they must serve
an important government objective and must be substantially related to
achievement of that objective. Id. at 565. In comparison, if the FCC policies
needed to pass strict scrutiny they would have to serve a compelling state
interest and the program would have to be narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.
36. Id. at 567.
1997]
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fore a sufficient basis for the Commission's minority own-
ership policies. Just as a "diverse student body"
contributing to a "robust exchange of ideas" is a "constitu-
tionally permissible goal" on which a race-conscious univer-
sity admissions program may be based, University of
California v. Bakke, (opinion of Powell, J.). The diversity of
views and information on the airwaves serves important
First Amendment values.3
7
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, underscored the "unques-
tionable" legitimacy of the diversity interest in both the "broad-
cast and the professional school setting."ss
Metro Broadcasting's dissent, written byJustice O'Connor and
joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, first criticized
the majority's application of intermediate scrutiny to federal pro-
grams. Justice O'Connor believed that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate test.3 9 The dissent then discussed what it considered
was a compelling state interest.
Rejecting the majority's broadcast diversity justification,'
the dissent concluded that the equal protection doctrine had
thus far recognized only one compelling state interest: remedy-
ing the effects of racial discrimination.41 The dissent criticized
the majority's broadcast diversity justification because it was "sim-
ply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any
legitimate basis for employing racial classifications. "4
The dissent thought broadcast diversity too amorphous for
several reasons. First, "[t]he FCC's policies assume, and rely
upon, the existence of a tightly bound 'nexus' between the own-
ers' race and the resulting programming."' Diversity is a com-
pelling interest only if it exposes diverse viewpoints to the public.
37. Id. at 567-68.
38. Justice Stevens wrote that "(t]he public interest in broadcast diversity
like the interest in an integrated police force, diversity in the composition of a
public school body of a professional school - is in my view unquestionably
legitimate." Id. at 601-02. "Unquestionably legitimate" is the wording used by
Stevens in strict scrutiny cases. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because racial characteristics so seldom
provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, and because classifications
based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic, it is
especially important that the reasons for any such classifications be dearly
identified and unquestionably legitimate.") (emphasis added).
39. Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990).
40. Justice Kennedy, joined byJustice Scalia, labeled broadcast diversity a
"trivial" state interest. Id. at 633.
41. Id. at 612.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 626.
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The justification is necessarily based on the premise that differ-
ent races have different viewpoints. "Such policies may embody
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race.""
To base a state program on the presumption that an individual
held a viewpoint because of their race was for the state to "imper-
missibly equat[e] race with thoughts and behavior."'
. Another problem the dissent had with the diversity justifica-
tion for racial classifications was that it had "no logical stopping
point ."4 First, there is no principled way to define or measure a
particular viewpoint that might be associated with race. How
does one define a "Black viewpoint," an "Asian viewpoint," or a
"White viewpoint"? Second, a diversity justification would sup-
port the indefinite use of racial classifications, "employed first to
obtain the appropriate mixture of racial views and then to ensure
that the broadcasting spectrum continues to reflect the mix-
ture."47 The dissent equated this with clearly unconstitutional
"outright racial balancing."' Third, the diversity justification is
capable of supporting measures that are difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to distinguish from proscribed discrimination and can be
used to benefit or burden racial groups:
Divorced from any remedial purpose and otherwise unde-
fined, "benign" means only what shifting fashions and
changing politics deems acceptable. Members of any racial
or ethnic group, whether now preferred under the FCC's
policies or not, may find themselves politically out of fash-
ion and subject to disadvantageous but "benign"
discrimination.'
Finally, after concluding that diversity did not constitute a com-
pelling state interest, the dissent found that the FCC policy was
not narrowly tailored to serve an interest in diversity. The dissent
44. Id. at 604. See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 US. 630, 647 (1993) ("[racial
gerrymandering] reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community
in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions
elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.")
45. Justice O'Connor made this additional comment on the diversity
justification: "[T]he interest in diversity of viewpoints provides no legitimate,
much less important, reason to employ race classifications." Id. at 615.
46. Id. at 613. See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US. 469,
498 (1989) (objecting to the role-model justification for race-based decision
making because it is essentially limitless in scope and duration).
47. Metro Broadcasting, 497 US. at 614.
48. Id. at 614 (citing Crosot, 488 U.S. at 507).
49. Id. at 615.
1997]
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pointed out the availability of race-neutral alternatives. Citing
Bakke, Justice O'Connor commented that
Even if distinct views could be associated with particular
ethnic and racial groups, focusing on this particular aspect
of the Nation's views calls into question the Government's
genuine commitment to its asserted interest. Our equal
protection doctrine governing intermediate review indi-
cates that the Government may not use race and ethnicity
as a proxy for other, more germane bases of
classification. 5
The dissent found that the FCC used race as a proxy for whatever
views it believed to be under-represented. But a racial classifica-
tion is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive because it fails to
take into account the viewpoints in any individual case.5 A race-
neutral alterative would be for the FCC to directly advance its
interest by requiring licensees to provide programming that the
FCC believed would add to broadcast diversity.5" The dissent
also found that the FCC policies were unduly burdensome on the
disfavored individuals.55
Though not directly concerned with diversity, the Supreme
Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peni' 4 overruled Metro
Broadcasting's intermediate scrutiny standard, dissolving the pre-
vious judicial distinction between federal and state actions.
Adarand made it clear that all race-based classifications, imposed
by a federal or state governmental actor, must be analyzed under
strict scrutiny.'
Adarand raises two points of interest for our particular
inquiry. First, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, overruled
Metro Broadcasting only as far as it was inconsistent with the use of
strict scrutiny in analyzing federal legislation.' Justice
50. Id. at 621 (citation omitted).
51. I&
52. Id. at 622.
53. Id. at 630.
54. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
55. Id. at 2113.
56. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, noted in his dissent:
The majority today overrules Metro Broadcasting only insofar as it is
"inconsistent with [the] holding" that strict scrutiny applies to
'benign" racial classifications promulgated by the Federal
Government. [cite omitted] The proposition that fostering diversity
may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is not
inconsistent with the Court's holding today - indeed, the question is
not remotely presented in this case - and I do not take the Court's
opinion to diminish that aspect of our decision in Metro Broadcasting.
Id. at 2127-28.
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O'Connor did not comment on whether diversity, found to be
"at least" an important state interest in Metro Broadcasting, could
constitute a compelling state interest in certain contexts. Justice
O'Connor also cited Bakke without criticizing or commenting on
Justice Powell's use of the diversity justification. 7 This may not
be too surprising, however, since Adarand was a federal con-
tracting minority set-aside case where the argument for diversity
was not easily applicable.
The second interesting point in Adarand. Justices Scalia and
Thomas, in separate concurring opinions, indicated rather
strongly that no affirmative action program could survive strict
scrutiny."8 Justice O'Connor, however, explicitly stated that strict
scrutiny is not fatal in fact.59 Thus a majority of the Court left
open the possibility that an affirmative action program properly
based and constructed could pass strict scrutiny. Strong evidence
suggests, however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist" and Justice
O'Connor61 would recognize only the remedying of present
57. Justice O'Connor cited Powell's decision in Bakke to support the
application of strict scrutiny to "benign" racial classifications. She also noted
that Bakw lacked a majority opinion. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108.
58. Justice Scalia stressed that the Constitution protected the individual
and reiterated that even the "most admirable and benign of purposes" still
reinforces the thinking that produced "race slavery, race privilege and race
hatred." Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In line with Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas wrote: "[G] overnment-sponsored
racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as
discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial
discrimination, plain and simple." Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
59. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority.
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." [cite omitted]. The unhappy persistence of
both the practice and the lingering side effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.
Id. at 2117.
60. To understand Justice Rehnquist's position, Justice Stewart's dissent
in Fuilove v. Klutznick is helpful:
[A] judicial decree that imposes burdens on the basis of race can be
upheld only where its sole purpose is to eradicate the actual effects of
illegal race discrimination.... Since the MOE provision [construction
set-aside program] was in whole or in part designed to effectuate
objectives other than the elimination of the effects of racial
discrimination, it cannot stand as a remedy that comports with the
strictures of equal protection.
Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 528-30 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
61. For Justice O'Connor's position, Justice Powell's lead opinion in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education is helpful. Powell wrote: "[T]he Court has
insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
19971
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effects of past discrimination as a constitutionally permissible
compelling state interest.
Since Adarand, only a few district courts have addressed the
continued viability of the diversity justification for race-based
classifications.
B. The Fifth Circuit Hopwood Decision
In Hopwood four white students applied to the University of
Texas Law School in 1992.62 These students, based on GPA and
LSAT scores, were considered discretionary candidates. This
meant that they were between the presumptive admit and pre-
sumptive denial categories for white applicants. After the law
school failed to extend an offer of admissions to any of the four
plaintiffs, they sued primarily under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that they were subjected
to unconstitutional racial discrimination by the law school's
admissions process.63
Applicants to the law school were categorized by race, which
gave certain favored minority groups preferential treatment dur-
ing the admissions process. The preferences assisted African
Americans and Mexican Americans to the detriment of whites
and non-preferred minorities." The law school maintained for
the benefit of the preferred minorities different presumptive
admit and denial standards, separate evaluation processes, and
segregated waiting lists.'
In Hopwood, District Court Judge Sparks held that all classifi-
cations based on race regardless of their purpose must be ana-
lyzed under strict scrutiny.' As noted earlier, strict scrutiny
means that race-based classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling state
interests. 67 Judge Sparks rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the only compelling state interest recognized by the Supreme
involved before allowing limited use of radal classifications in order to remedy
such discrimination." And that there is a "requirement that race-based state
action be remedial." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 US. 267, 274, 278 n.5
(1986) (Powell, J., opinion, joined by O'Connor, J.).
62. The Univeristy of Texas Law School receives over 4,000 applications a
year to fill an entering class of about 500 students. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d.
932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996).
63. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 553 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd 78
F.3d. 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
64. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934.
65. Id. at 936-38.
66. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551, 567-69 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir.).
67. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
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Court as a valid justification for race-based classifications was the
remedying of present effects of past racial discrimination. 8
Next, Judge Sparks turned to the diversity rationale prof-
fered by the Texas law school. Judge Sparks first noted that edu-
cation is a unique context in our society, and then wrote that
none of the recent [affirmative action] opinions is factually
based in the education context and, therefore, none
* focuses on the unique role of education in our society.
Absent an explicit statement from the Supreme Court
overruling Bakke, this Court finds, in the context of the
law school's admissions process, obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse stu-
dent body remains a sufficiently compelling interest to sup-
port the use of racial classifications.
Judge Sparks also cited evidence, including the testimony of
deans from law schools across the country and former and cur-
rent law students, that the benefits of a diverse student body were
substantial.7 0 Nevertheless Judge Sparks found that the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School's admissions program failed the strict
scrutiny test because their admissions process was not narrowly
tailored. Like the U.C. Davis program in Bakke, the University of
Texas's program failed to provide an individual comparison
between minority and non-minority candidates. Due to the seg-
regated admissions process and waiting lists, the University of
Texas in effect used race not just as a "?lus" factor but rather as
the determinative factor in admissions. I
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and stated that
"there is essentially only one compelling state interest to justify
racial classifications: remedying past wrongs."' Judge Smith,
after reaffirming the district court's use of strict scrutiny, rejected
diversity as a rationale for affirmative action and found that "Jus-
tice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent"7 5 on the
issue of diversity because it "garnered only [Powell's] own vote
and has never represented the view of a majority of the Court in
the Bakke or any other case."74 The court noted that no other
Supreme Court decision had accepted diversity as a compelling
state interest under strict scrutiny analysis.7' Judge Smith, writ-
68. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551, 570-71.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 571.
71. Id. at 578-79.
72. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. I&
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ing for himself and Judge DeMoss, cited what he dubbed Justice
O'Connor's Adaranrvindicated dissent in Metro Broadcasting.
Modem equal protection has recognized only one [com-
pelling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial dis-
crimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of
broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It
is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unre-
lated to any legitimate basis for employing racial
classifications.76
To further his contention that diversity is not a valid justifi-
cation for race-based classifications, Judge Smith articulated sev-
eral anti-diversity arguments. First, Judge Smith argued that
racial classifications, if not remedial, stigmatize minorities. Cit-
ing the Croson plurality, Judge Smith found that "'[u]nless
[racial classifications] are strictly reserved for remedial settings,
they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to
a politics of racial hostility.' "71 Judge Smith also cited Justice
Thomas's Adarand concurrence to buttress his stigma argument
"So-called 'benign" discrimination teaches many that because of
chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot
compete with them without their patronizing indulgence....
These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority."78
Next, Judge Smith emphasized the "rights created by the...
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the indi-
vidual."' In contrast, the concept of diversity assumes that race
is a proxy for some desirable characteristics and focuses not on
the individual but on a racial group. Judge Smith stated that
[w]ithin the general principles of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher
education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of
equal protection. Diversity fosters, rather than minimizes,
the use of race. It treats minorities as a group, rather than
as individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, just
as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus
fueling racial hostility.80
76. Id. at 945 (citing Metft Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
77. 78 F.3d at 944-45 (citing City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (plurality decision)).
78. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
79. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 941 (citing SheULy v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948)).
80. Id. at 945.
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The court also rejected wholesale the Bakke "plus" factor as
unconstitutional:
The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply
achieves a student body that looks different. Such a crite-
rion is no more rational on its own terms than would be
choices based upon the physical size or blood types of
applicants. . . . [T]he use of ethnic diversity simply to
achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of the considera-
tion of a number of factors, is unconstitutional.81
As alternatives to race, the court suggested that the law school
could reasonably consider a variety of other factors, "some of
which may have some correlation with race," 2 when making
admissions decisions. The list of factors reads much like Justice
Powell's in Bakke - extra-curriculars, alumni status, etc. - with
the exclusion of race. Race cannot be used as a "proxy for other
characteristics that institutions of higher education value but that
do not raise similar constitutional concerns."- Recalling Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, the court rejected the
use of assumptions based on race: "The assumption is that a cer-
tain individual possesses characteristics by virtue of being a mem-
ber of a certain racial group."' This is not an assumption that
the Constitution allows the government to make. "[I]t is incor-
rect and legally inappropriate to impute to women and minori-
ties 'a different attitude about such issues as the federal budget,
school prayer, voting, and foreign relations.'" s5
The court also made it clear that no amount of social scien-
tific evidence - evidence that may tend to establish a correlation
between some viewpoints and race - can overcome the constitu-
tional mandate to think in terms of an individual and not in
terms of a racial group. In other words, even if there are substan-
tial efficiencies gained by sorting people by race because it is a
good proxy for functional classifications, the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits the government from doing so.
What's more, the court rationalized, if race were a proxy for
diverse characteristics, diversity would be better served by look-
ing directly at the diverse characteristics on an applicant-by-appli-
cant basis. Returning to the Equal Protection Clause's
protection of the individual the court found that "individuals,
81. Id. at 945-46.
82. Id. at 946.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 946 n.30.
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with their own conception of life, further diversity of view-
point."87 By protecting the individual, the court would protect
diversity. "[We only observe that 'diversity' can take many
forms. To foster such diversity, state universities and law schools
and other governmental entities must scrutinize applicants indi-
vidually, rather than resorting to the dangerous proxy of race." "
The court then turned to the district court's determination
that the law school's affirmative action program had a compel-
ling "remedial purpose."' Using the law school as the relevant
state actor and not the Texas school system in general, the court
found an insufficient nexus between any past discrimination and
present effects. The court attributed the school's present hostile
environment and bad reputation among minorities to "societal
discrimination," and the Supreme Court in Bakke rejected "socie-
tal discrimination" as a justification for affirmative action.90 The
Hopwood Court added that racial tension at the University of
Texas, "if anything, is contributed to, rather than alleviated by,
the overt and prevalent consideration of race in admissions." "
The Hopwood majority significantly left open the possibility for
the awarding of compensatory and punitive damages against
offending universities.ft
In contrast, Judge Wiener, concurring in the judgment, held
diversity did constitute a compelling state interest. He wrote that
[t]he main reason that I cannot go along with the panel
opinion ... [that diversity is not a compelling state inter-
est] is that I do not read the applicable Supreme Court
precedent as having held squarely and unequivocally
either that remedying effects of past discrimination is the
only compelling governmental interest that can everjustify
racial classifications, or conversely that achieving diversity
in the student body of a public graduate or professional
school can never be a compelling state interest. Indeed,
the panel opinion itself hedges a bit on whether the
Supreme Court's square holdings have gone that far, par-
ticularly in the realm of higher education.... I perceive no
87. Id.
88. Id. at 947.
89. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd., 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
90. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978)
(Powell, J., opinion).
91. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
92. This case was remanded to the district court to reconsider the issue of
damages. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
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"compelling" reason to rush in where the Supreme Court
fears - or at least declines - to tread.93
Thus, Judge Wiener's main concern appears to be the impropri-
ety of ignoring Supreme Court precedent and not in the logical
arguments against the diversity justification that Judge Smith
articulated in his opinion. Even though Judge Wiener refused to
joinjudge Smith's assessment of the precedential status ofJustice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, he nevertheless joined the Court's
judgment because he found the law school's program was insuffi-
ciently tailored to achieve diversity.9 He noted that "racial diver-
sity is not true diversity, and a system thus conceived and
implemented simply is not narrowly tailored to achieve
diversity."95
The Fifth Circuit, although never requested by the parties,
polled its members and denied en banc review.96 Seven judges
wrote a scathing dissent calling the panel opinion "not just en
banc-worthy but en banc mandatory."97 The dissent first criti-
cized their colleagues for not granting en banc review in a case
where "[the radical implications of ... [judge Smith's panel
opinion], with its sweeping dicta, will literally change the face of
public educational institutions throughout Texas, the other
states of this circuit, and this nation."98 The dissent then
attacked the panel opinion for overruling Bakke, stating "[t]he
syllogisms tacked together and proffered by the majority opinion
as proof that justice Powell's diversity conclusion is no longer
good law do not, under any standards of which we are aware,
qualify as an overruling of Bakke."' Thus, even if the panel
believed that the Supreme Court would eventually overrule
Bakke, they nevertheless should have applied Bakke's diversity
analysis as binding precedent to the case before them. Instead,
the panel "chartered a path into terra incognita. Judicial self-
restraint was the first casualty; it proved to be too burdensome.
The teachings proscribing the consideration of constitutional
issues unnecessary to the decision soon followed. With these two
limitations adroitly set aside, the panel majority apparently con-
sidered itself positioned to overrule Bakke."1°
93. Id. at 964-65 (Wiener, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 966.
95. Id
96. Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 722 (Politz, CJ., dissenting, joined by King, Wiener, Benavides,
Stewart, Parker and Dennis).
98. I&
99. Id. at 723-24.
100. Id, at 724.
1997]
402 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS &' PUBLIC POLICY [VoL 11
Three months after the Fifth Circuit denied en banc review,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justice Souter, wrote that "[w] hether it is constitutional
for a public college or graduate school to use race or national
origin as a factor in its admissions process is an issue of great
national importance." 10 1 Justice Ginsburg noted that the law
school and the plaintiffs both agreed that the 1992 admissions
policy was unconstitutional, therefore the law school was request-
ing review of the Fifth Circuit's rationale behind their judgment
and not of the judgment itself. Justice Ginsburg stated, "we must
await a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy
before addressing the important question raised in the peti-
tion."102 This highly ambiguous statement suggests that denial of
certiorari may have been based on mootness or lack of case or
controversy grounds, and it left open the possibility that diversity
may still constitute a compelling state interest in higher
education.
Other district and appellate court decisions appear to sup-
port the Fifth Circuit's reading of the Supreme Court's current
affirmative action jurisprudence. For. instance, in McLaughlin v.
Boston School Committee,"03 a Massachusetts district court found
that a thirty-five percent set-aside for Black and Hispanic students
for admissions to a highly regarded public school violated a white
candidate's right to equal protection. Judge Garrity, after admit-
ting that "the development of the law in this politically charged
area is far from complete,""° and that "school authorities are
traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and imple-
ment educational policy,"' 05 found that the set-aside failed the
strict scrutiny test. Judge Garrity, like Judge Wiener's concur-
rence in Hopwood, declined to decide directly whether diversity
constituted a compelling state interest. Instead, he mentioned
both Bakke and Hopwood and refused to grant summaryjudgment
for McLaughlin because at least two Supreme Court Justices
(Ginsburg and Souter) indicated when denying certiorari that
they did not view Hopwood as the final word on whether diversity
constituted a compelling government interest in higher
education.10 6
101. Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
102. Id.
103. Catherine McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001 (D.
Mass. 1996).
104. Id. at 1009.
105. Id. at 1010 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte Mecldenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
106. Id. at 1015.
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After Judge Garrity skirted the diversity issue, he decided
that Boston's race-based preference plan did not pass strict scru-
tiny because the set-aside failed the narrowly tailored portion of
the test. Judge Garrity cited three reasons: (1) the set-aside had
no built-in termination provision; (2) the school district did not
consider less racially preferential plans to achieve the same diver-
sity, and (3) such race-neutral alternatives were most likely
available. 117
In another case consistent with Hopwood's analysis of race-
based preferences, the Third Circuit en banc rejected the notion
that diversity constituted a compelling state interest in Title VII
employment cases. In Taxman v. Board of Education of the Town-
ship of Piscataway,'08 the school board, faced with the need to lay
off one of two equally qualified teachers, chose to retain the Afri-
can American teacher for diversity reasons (she was the only Afri-
can American in her department). The Third Circuit found that
this non-remedial purpose for the race-based program did not
pass strict scrutiny. °o Reluctant to find that a diverse faculty had
no value at all, Judge Mansmann wrote the following:
While we rejected the argument that the Board's non-
remedial application of the affirmative action policy is con-
sistent with the language and intent of Title VII, we do nor
reject in principle the diversity goal articulated by the
Board. Indeed, we recognize that the differences among
us underlie the richness and strength of our Nation. Our
disposition of this matter, however, rests squarely on the
foundation of Title VII. Although we applaud the goal of
racial diversity, we cannot agree that Title VII permits an
employer to advance that goal through non-remedial dis-
criminatory measurers. 10
Further, the court found that the program was not narrowly tai-
lored because the Board's discretionary use of race as a tie-
breaker between two equally qualified candidates was too vague
for application, was unlimited in duration, and was void of goals
and standards."'
A third case, Podberesky v. Kinan, pre-dates Hopwood but
exemplifies how difficult it is to establish a compelling state inter-
est to justify racial classifications even when the purpose of the
107. Id. at 1016.
108. Sharon Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 91
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
109. Id. at 1550.
110. Id. at 1567.
111. Id. at 1564.
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program is remedying the effects of past discrimination." 2 The
Fourth Circuit court concluded that a race-exclusive scholarship
program failed the strict scrutiny test because it was not narrowly
tailored to remedy present effects of past discrimination."' The
University of Maryland College Park (UMCP) also failed to
demonstrate the existence of present effects of past discrimina-
tion despite previous dejure segregation of the Maryland school
system and a lengthy research effort by the university. 4 UMCP
did not proffer a diversity justification for its race-exclusive schol-
arship program, but considering the high level of proof the
Fourth Circuit demanded to justify remedial measures, it is
highly unlikely a diversity justification would have fared better.
C. Crit'ism of the Hopwood Decision
There are various legal arguments available to refute the
Hopwood decision. For instance, one could argue that Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Adarand majority, did not in fact
intend to overturn Bakke, but instead cited it without comment-
ing on Justice Powell's diversity justification, thus leaving that
portion of Powell's opinion standing. It is also unclear whether a
majority of the Supreme Court intended to foreclose any other
compelling state interest beyond remedying the effects of past
discrimination. While there is evidence that some of the Justices
would so limit affirmative action,115 there is also evidence that
several Justices would give the state far more latitude. 6 In light
of the constitutional uncertainty left after Adarand, one might
well wonder by what authority the Fifth Circuit disregarded Bakke
and explicitly found no compelling state interest in diversity.11
7
Despite the apparent consensus amongst Hopwood, McLaugh-
lin, and Piscataway, federal courts lack unanimity on whether
diversity can constitute a compelling state interest. In fact, the
Department of Justice subscribed to an opposite reading of
112. Podbereskyv. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 2001 (1995).
113. Id. at 161.
114. Id. at 161. Contra Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994)
(court upheld race-preference scholarships at state college campuses that
showed present effects of past discrimination).
115. See Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J.,
commenting on denial of certiorari).
117. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (Politz, C.J., dissenting from
denial of en banc reviewjoined by King, Wiener, Benavides, Stewart, Parker and
Dennis).
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Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence. After the
Supreme Court decision in Adarand, the Department of Justice
noted that the "Court did not address the constitutionality of
programs aimed at advancing nonremedial objectives - such as
promoting diversity and inclusion."' The Department of Jus-
tice concluded from this that " [u ] nder strict scrutiny, it is uncer-
tain whether and in what setting diversity is a permissible goal of
affirmative action beyond the higher education context" 1 IThe
phrase "beyond the higher education context" assumes that
within the higher education context diversity is clearly a compel-
ling state interest. The Department ofJustice also noted that Jus-
tice Stevens mentioned in his Adarand dissent that the majority's
silence on the question did not foreclose the use of affirmative
action to serve nonremedial ends.'
Confronting the argument that the diversity justification is
based on an impermissible presumption that members of a racial
group have a "minority perspective," the Department of Justice
stated that
[t]here are sound arguments to support the contention
that seeking diversity in higher education rests on valid
assumptions. The thesis does not presume that al individ-
uals of a particular race or ethnic background think and
act alike. Rather, it is premised on what seems to be a com-
mon sense proposition that in the aggregate, increasing
the diversity of the student body is bound to make a differ-
ence in the array of perspectives communicated at a
university.1 21
According to the Department of Justice's analysis, Adarand
affected the diversity justification only minimally, if at all. The
Department ofJustice only cautioned that after Adarand "a court
might demand some proof of a nexus between the diversification
of the student body and the diversity of viewpoints expressed on
the campus."" This is much the same approach as some post-
Adarand district and circuit courts.
For example, in Wittmer v. Peters2 1 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Pos-
118. Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Department ofJustice, Pub.
No. 776, Memorandum on Supreme Court's Adarand Decision at 222 (1995).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 231 (citing 63 U.S.L.W. at 4539 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
121. Id. at 234.
122. Id.
123. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996). But ef. Hayes v. North State Law
Enforcement Officers Assoc., 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993) (without deciding
whether diversity within a police department is a compelling state interest the
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ner,124 held that administrators of a county boot camp could pre-
fer black male applicants over white applicants for a lieutenant's
positions without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The
plaintiffs in the case were three white correctional officers who
applied unsuccessfully for a lieutenants position. A black appli-
cant, ranking forty-second on the applicant test (while the plain-
tiffs ranked third, sixth, and eighth), received the position. The
Illinois Department of Corrections did not deny that race was a
factor in the appointment, but instead presented expert testi-
mony attesting to the penological necessity for the appointment.
The defendant pointed out that sixty-eight percent of the
inmates at the correctional boot camp were black. In contrast
the staff was overwhelmingly white. 25
The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's contention that
the only permissible race-based classification must be based on
the compelling state interest in rectifying past discrimination.
Judge Posner noted "[t]hat question remains open in the
Supreme Court,"126 and that the majority is in favor of permit-
ting some reverse discrimination, although how much is
unclear. 27 Applying the strict scrutiny test, Judge Posner found
that "the rectification of past discrimination is not the only set-
ting in which government officials can lawfully take race into
Fourth Circuit found no "strong basis in evidence" for the necessity of diversity
despite expert opinion of chief of police and reports prepared in response to
urban riots).
124. The fact that the opinion was written by Judge Posner is interesting
because he had previously appeared to reject any use of racial classifications:
[T]he use of a racial characteristic to establish a presumption that the
individual also possesses other, and socially relevant, characteristics
exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the mode of thought and
behavior that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modem
America. . .. [T]he proper constitutional principle is not, no
"invidious" racial or ethnic discrimination, but no use of racial or
ethnic criteria to determine the distribution of government benefits
and burdens. . . . To ask whether racial exclusion may not have
overriding benefits for both races in particular circumstances is to
place the antidiscrimination principle at the mercy of the vagaries of
empirical conjecture and thereby free the judge to enact his personal
values into constitutional doctrine.
Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treat-
ment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 12, 25-26 (1974).
125. Wittme, 87 F.3d at 917 ("The security staff consists of 48 correctional
officers, of whom only 2 were black when the camp opened and during the
period relevant to this suit, plus 3 captains all of whom were white and 10
lieutenants of whom 2 (a man and a woman) were black.").
126. Id. at 918.
127. Id.
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account in making decisions.""'2 Judge Posner could find no log-
ical or equitable rationale to favor the rectification of past dis-
crimination over other legitimate goals that race-based
preferences might serve." 2 He noted that
the usual case in which a remedy giving preference to a
racial or other historically disfavored group is defended as
necessary to rectify past discrimination, the plaintiffs, the
people who will benefit from the remedy, are not the peo-
ple who were discriminated against, but their successors or
descendants. For them the relief is a windfall, and its justi-
fication must be sought elsewhere than in notions of com-
pensation that might seem to make a stronger case for a
discriminatory remedy than an interest in racial peace or
effective prison administration would make.' 30
He then proceeded to find a compelling state interest in hir-
ing black correctional officers. Judge Posner's finding was based
on two grounds, first that the law enforcement and correctional
settings presented a special context and "the clearest examples of
cases in which departure from racial neutrality are permissi-
ble,"' 3 ' and second, on the defendant's unrefuted expert testi-
mony that "[t]he black lieutenant is needed because the black
inmates are believed unlikely to play the correctional game of
brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some
blacks in authority in the camp."3 2 Judge Posner conceded that
the expert witnesses had in fact little experience with boot camps
and that the "social scientific literature on which they relied on
does not focus on such institutions." 33 Unconvinced, however,
by the plaintiffs, Judge Posner wrote that
[i]f academic research is required to validate any depar-
ture from strict racial neutrality, social experimentation in
128. Id. at 919. Judge Posner wrote the following:
The plaintiffs argue that the only form of racial discrimination that
can survive strict scrutiny is discrimination designed to cure the ill
effects of past discrimination by the public institution that is asking to
be allowed to try this dangerous cure. There are dicta to this effect.
... [b]ut there is a reason that dicta are dicta and not holdings, that is,
are not authoritative. A judge would be unreasonable to conclude
that no other consideration except a history of discrimination could
ever warrant a discriminatory measure unless every other
consideration had been presented to and rejected by him.
Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 920.
133. Id.
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the area of race will be impossible despite its urgency....
On the conception of strict scrutiny advanced by the plain-
tiffs the first boot camp that tried to alter the racial compo-
sition of its staff would be enjoined. It would be impossible
to accrue experience on the issue and the whole boot
camp experiment might fail if, as the defendants' experts
believe, its success requires some departure from racial
neutrality.T 4
Judge Posner in essence concluded like Justice Burger in
Fulilove that "[t]o stay experimentation in things social and eco-
nomic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. " "
Thus, Judge Posner made two important analyses that merit
attention. First, he explicitly stated that under the Seventh Cir-
cuit's reading of the Equal Protection Clause, other state inter-
ests beyond remedying the past effects of discrimination could
constitute a compelling state interest. Second, under strict scru-
tiny the government must have a "[s ] trong basis in evidence" that
affirmative action is necessary.1 6 Judge Posner implied that
unrefuted expert testimony, though minimal, could serve as the
necessary evidentiary nexus between a compelling state interest
and a race-based preference program. Also, Judge Posner's
emphasis on the special nature of the "correctional setting"
arguably fails to distinguish Wzttmer from an "educational setting"
case because education, just like the correctional setting, has
been afforded special constitutional consideration.137
For this study of "diversity," it is interesting to note that
Judge Posner, though not directly invalidating diversity as a com-
pelling state interest, mentioned that the defendants did not rely
on "generalities about racial balance or diversity... [or] a goal
of racial balanc[ing]"'" for their justification. This implies that
134. Id.
135. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger,
J., announcing the judgment of the Court and in which Justices White and
Powell joined).
136. City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989). Cf.
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (Fourth Circuit held that the
University of Maryland College Park failed to demonstrate a strong basis in
evidence for its conclusion that remedial action is necessary despite previous de
jure segregation of the Maryland school system and a lengthy research effort
made by the university), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2001 (1995).
137. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Office of the Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice, Pub. No. 776, Memorandum on Supreme
Court's Adarand Decision (1995).
138. Wuttmer, 87 F.3d at 920.
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a legislative experiment based on social scientific evidence could
pass strict scrutiny because it is less vague and less amorphous
than race-based classifications based on diversity. Furthermore,
Wittmer racial-preferences infringe less on innocent third parties
because the correctional institution can establish a termination
goal, for instance, when the correctional facility hired a certain
number of African American guards. Also, it is easier to measure
a decrease in correctional boot camp belligerence or violence
than it is to measure the improved quality of education stemming
from diversity. In other words, the Wittmer project is more sus-
ceptible to proofs.1 s9
III. Hopwood v. Texas: Is the Fifth Circuit's Decision Ethical?
After considering the various legal arguments and case
precedents available to refute or support the Hopwood decision, a
core question remains: Was the decision right, not in a legal
sense, but in an ethical sense? To answer this question, first one
must decide whether or not diversity is valuable in the higher
education context. If the answer is yes, then one must ask
whether there are other interests that race-based affirmative
action impinges, and if so, whether the importance of these
interests outweigh the benefits of diversity.
A. The Value of Diversity
Probably the most famous and eloquent defense of diversity
in an educational context comes from the President of Princeton
University, cited by Justice Powell in Bakke
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs
through interactions among students of both sexes; of dif-
ferent races, religions, and backgrounds; who come from
cities and rural areas, from various states and countries;
who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspec-
tives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from
their differences and to stimulate one another to reexam-
ine even their most deeply held assumptions about them-
selves and their world. As a wise graduate of ours observed
in commenting on this aspect of the educational process,
139. In another case, Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education, a district
court approved a consent decree that allowed state post-secondary education
officials to consider race and gender when hiring employees. A consent decree
is subject to the same analysis under strict scrutiny as a voluntary affirmative
action plan. The decision did not discuss the effects, if any, of Adarand, and it
did not specifically discuss the diversityjustification. Shuford v. Alabama Bd. of
Educ., 897 F. Supp. 1535 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
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"People do not learn very much when they are surrounded
only by the likes of themselves."
In the nature of things, it is hard to know how, and
when, and even if, this informal "learning through diver-
sity" actually occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For
many, however, the unplanned, casual encounters with
roommates, fellow sufferers in an organic chemistry class,
student workers in the library, teammates on a basketball
squad, or other participants in class affairs or student gov-
ernment can be subtle and yet powerful sources of
improved understanding and personal growth. 14°
Justice Powell in Bakke pointed to a common belief in academia
that diversity added to the "robust exchange of ideas" so central
to higher education as evidenced by the commentary of faculty,
students, and administrators alike. Diversity, for Justice Powell,
had a value despite its inability to be quantified, or even directly
verified.1 41 A diverse student body could be viewed as an " 'edu-
cational resource' comparable in importance to the faculty,
library, or science laboratories."" And the educational benefit
of diversity extends beyond the student's formal education. For
example, Neil L. Rudenstine, president of Harvard University,
noted that
if we want a society in which our physicians, teachers, archi-
tects, public servants, and other professionals possess a
developed sense of vocation and calling; if we want them to
be able to gain some genuine understanding of the variety
of human beings with whom they will work, and whom they
will serve; if we want them to think imaginatively and to act
effectively in relation to the needs and the values of their
communities, then we shall have to take diversity into
account as one among many significant factors in graduate
and professional school admissions and education. 43
Also an appreciation of diversity helps avert racial tensions, and
dispels - for black and white students alike - any idea that
white supremacy governs our social institutions.'4
140. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 n.48 (Powell, J., opinion) (quoting Bowen,
Admissios and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLy. 7, 9 (Sept. 26,
1977)).
141. Id. at 311-15.
142. Neil L. Rudenstine, Harvard University: The President's Report
"Diversity and Learning" 19-20 (Jan. 1996) (on file with the NotreDameJournal of
Law, Ethics & Publi Policy).
143. Id. at 25.
144. For further forward looking, nonremedialjustifications for voluntary
affirmative action see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Terms's
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The amorphous, yet real value of diversity is also taken into
account in other legal contexts. For instance, the law recognizes
the need for a "fair cross section" of the community, including
minorities, when constituting a jury.' Also, as the majority in
Metro Broadcasting noted, many "voting rights cases operate on
the assumption that minorities have particular viewpoints and
interests worthy of protection.""4
B. The Counter Value of Individual Fairness
Justice Powell noted in Bakke that "there is a measure of
inequity in forcing innocent persons.., to bear the burdens of
redressing grievances not of their making." 47 This observation
brings up an obvious point when a minority is offered a seat in a
law school class, someone else is not. This becomes a problem
when that someone else is more qualified. An individual is being
harmed just as an individual is being helped by affirmative
action, and it is this individual who can call upon the Equal Pro-
tection Clause for protection. AsJustice Powell wrote, "[ i]t is the
individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifica-
tions based upon his racial or ethnic background because such
distinctions impinge upon personal rights.""4 Justice Powell also
noted that "[n]othing in the Constitution supports the notion
that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible
burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic
groups."149 Stephen L. Carter, professor of law at Yale University,
stated it this way: "We must learn to love and cherish individuals
for who they are, not for what they represent; and, having
learned it once more ourselves, we can once more teach it to a
doubting world."'
Another negative side effect of favoring one person over
another based on a racial preference is the likely resentment
developed by the non-preferred individual:
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78 (1986) (suggesting employers
might advance forward-looking reasons for affirmative action like improving
their services to black constituencies, averting racial tension over allocation of
jobs in a community, or increasing diversity of a work force).
145. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1990).
146. Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 583 (1990) (citing United
Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 159 (1977)) (plurality
opinion).
147. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J., opinion).
148. Id. at 299.
149. Id. at 298.
150. CARTE, supra note 16, at 211.
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The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and oppor-
tunities may outrage those so deprived and therefore may
be perceived as invidious. These individuals are likely to
find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they
are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in
the dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired
by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One
should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and
the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system
of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin
color and ethnic origin.1 5'
This resentment, as the Hopwood majority noted, will only con-
tribute to any existing racial tension on campus.
15 2
C. Race as a Proxy for Diversity
If one concedes that diversity is good and that students ben-
efit immensely from it, problems still arise when an institution
uses race as a proxy for desired diversity. For one, there are a
myriad of procedural problems. In order to create an affirmative
action plan, an institution must first decide which racial catego-
ries to use and which merit "heightened solicitude." 5 ' To make
such a determination, the institution must decide which particu-
lar characteristics or viewpoints distinguish one race from
another and which of these attributes its student body lacks. The
institution would also have to decide when the proper mix of
diversity has been reached and how best to maintain it.
An institution would then need to categorize each individual
applicant by race. This will increasingly become a problem due
to the proliferation of mixed-race children. There is also a prob-
lem of lumping racial groups together because, as Farber noted,
racial scholarship "needs to be more attentive to diversity within
and between minority groups. Much of the current scholarship
is written as if all groups of non-whites were fungible."" Thus,
the institution's racial groupings will be imperfect, both as to the
racial categories it constructs and as to its categorization of indi-
vidual applicants.
Another problem with using race as a proxy for diversity is
that it injures the minority it intends to assist. Race-based affirm-
ative action tends to stigmatize minorities: "preferential pro-
151. BakeA 438 U.S. at 294-95 n.34 (Powell, J., opinion).
152. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941 (5th Cir. 1996).
153. Bakke 438 U.S. at 296.
154. Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL-
L. RLv. 893, 931 (1994).
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grams may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that
certain groups are unable to achieve success without special pro-
tection based on a factor having no relationship to individual
worth"1" because racial preferences are based on "general-
izations impermissibly equating race with thoughts and
behavior." "
Proponents of race-based affirmative action argue that there
is de facto affirmative action for non-minorities in the form of
legacy status.57 What, then, is different about using race or
ethnicity? The answer lies in the second side effect of race-based
affirmative action: the inevitable stereotyping that occurs. The
very presumption underlying race-based affirmative action is that
minorities are different in some appreciable way due to their
race. This is not true with legacy status or other admissions crite-
ria. Affirmative action assumes that race is a valid indicator of
other traits, traits that the educational institution believes will
add to the diversity of its student body. This is problematic
because, as Stephen L. Carter noted,
[t]he peculiar language forced upon us by programs that
treat people as members of groups and assign characteris-
tics on the basis of that membership has an ugly mirror
image, for it is as easy to assign negative characteristics as
positive ones. Preferential treatment comes in two kinds,
the kind we like and the kind we hate. Both kinds have
roots in the idea that race is a useful proxy for other infor-
mation: in the early days of affirmative action, a proxy for
disadvantage; today, a proxy for the ability to tell the story
of the oppressed.... [t] here has always been something
unsettling about the advocacy of a continuation of racial
consciousness in the name of eradicating it." s
Proponents of race-based affirmative action argue that
[t]he importance of a diverse student body and faculty
does not depend on the false notion that one's race or
155. Bakh 438 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J., opinion).
156. Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 615 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
157. As Richard Delgado noted:
It turns out that my university, like most others, has a host of express
quotas and a like number of preferences: drop-kickers, quarterbacks,
legacy candidates whose parents are apt to give money if Johnny or
Sally gets in, musicians, ROTC scholarship holders. Many of these
individuals have SATs lower than those of the straight admits.
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affir ative Action, 83 GEo.
LJ. 1711, 1728-29 (1995).
158. CARTER, supra note 16, at 210-11.
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ethnicity defines a particular way of thinking about issues
of law and policy. It does assume the reality - no less a
reality because it is socially constructed - that people of
different races and ethnicities often have different life
experiences. 159
This is similar to the majority's logic in Metro Bmoadcasting
. 
Diver-
sity will be achieved not because every individual minority holds a
certain racially determined point of view, but because, in the
aggregate, greater diversity will more likely occur with affirmative
action than without."
But even if one is convinced that diversity is served by this
aggregate approach (and that impermissible racial stereotypes
are not at issue) a fundamental question remains: is the use of
racial classifications the only practicable way of achieving diver-
sity or is there a less problematic alternative?
IV. RAcE NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES: How TO MAINTAIN DIvERsrTv
WITHOUT OFFENDING THE CONSTITUTION
Thus, the critical criteria [that make up a diverse student
body] are often individual qualities or experience not
dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it.161
Instead of giving racial minorities a "plus" factor it has often
been suggested that admissions committees give the socio-eco-
nomically disadvantaged a "plus" factor.1 6 This has the desirable
effect of assisting many of the same minorities who would have
benefited from race-based affirmative action, though admittedly
not all of them.
The main advantage of socio-economic plus factors as
opposed to racial plus factors is that it moots many of the harsh-
est arguments against affirmative action. 6 First, it does not even
arguably violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Constitution
addresses concerns about immutable characteristics, which eco-
nomic and social status are not; therefore, any such program
need not satisfy strict scrutiny. In fact, if ever challenged, the
program would need only pass the rational basis test. Second,
159. Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 855, 862 (1995).
160. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 579-82.
161. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323-24 (1978)
(appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (Harvard College Admissions Program).
162. Don Munro, The Continuing Evolution of Affirmative Action under Title
VII New Directios after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L. REv. 565 (1995).
163. For a comprehensive analysis of the benefits of socio-economic
"plus" factors as opposed to racial preferences. Id.
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the stigma argument loses its force since the "plus" factors are
based on economic factors and not on the assumption that cer-
tain racial groups are less able to achieve success without assist-
ance. Third, instead of using race as a proxy for need, it uses
need itself, which advantages the most deserving in all racial
groups. Likewise, the "plus" factors are not based on stereotypes
or assumptions about any group but are based on the needs and
qualities of particular individuals.
Brest and Oshige argue that socio-economic affirmative
action is inefficient because it helps not only minorities but
whites who don't have the same "corrective justice" or "multiplier
effect"16 justification as minorities. In fact, the individual scru-
tiny of additional admissions criteria will inevitably lengthen the
admissions process, rendering it more costly. But, as Judge Pos-
ner recognized, even if sorting people by racial and ethnic
grounds is efficient, it is nevertheless impermissible: "efficiency is
rejected as a basis for governmental action in [the equal protec-
tion] ... context."16 If there is a compelling institutional inter-
est in diversity, the institutions will have to commit the resources
to achieve that goal constitutionally despite the additional cost.
One final argument for switching to other diversity related
factors is a pragmatic one. Munro put it this way:
[S] ome preferences are better than none. The very real
danger of significant future cutbacks in permissible race-
based preference programs should inspire proaffirmative
action minority groups to consider contingency measures
that would allow the retention of at least some marginal
benefits to their constituencies. Thus, disadvantage prefer-
ences could be viewed as simply a wise hedge against future
changes in the law. 66
The reality is that whether one thinks Hopwood correctly con-
strued Adarand or not, the legal uncertainty and current political
mood will likely lead to an increase in the number of institutions
that voluntarily abandon their race-based affirmative action pro-
grams." 7 The promotion of socio-economic "plus" factors then
164. The multiplier effect is the granting of preferences not to benefit
the individual minority but to benefit other, less advantaged members of the
group by example. Brest & Oshige, supra note 159 at 897-98.
165. Posner, supra note 124, at 22.
166. Munro, supra note 162, at 607.
167. The stakes are high for universities. For instance if a college is found
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause they are not only open to civil suit
and administrative sanctions, but they could lose their tax exempt status. Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See also Rev. Rul. 71-447,
1971-2 C.B. 230.
1997]
416 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS &" PUBLIC POLICY [VoL 11
becomes a safety position, enabling proaffirmative action groups
to maintain some of the racial diversity they gained through race-
based affirmative action.
On top of socio-economic "plus factors," the Department of
Justice suggests several race-neutral alternatives to race-based
admissions processes, including recruiting and outreach to
minorities to expand the pool of minority applicants, training
programs open to all employees, diversity seminars, and eliminat-
ing selection criteria that have a disproportionate impact on
minorities.1" These broad programs, designed not to give
minorities a "plus" in the application process but to get more
minorities to apply, do not offend the Constitution and can add
to the diversity of a student body.
In fact, this is the chosen route of the University of Califor-
nia. Since the Board of Regents banned the use of race as an
admissions factor, the U.C. system has analyzed various substitute
criteria they could use to maintain student body diversity. The
U.C. system intends to add to its objective admissions criteria
(GPA, SAT score) increased subjective criteria. These subjective
criteria include athletic endeavors, interest in other cultures or
proficiency in other languages, significant community service or
significant participation in student government, and special cir-
cumstances in applicant's life experience that may evidence unu-
sual persistence and determination (e.g. disabilities, low flmily
income, first generation to attend college, need to work, disad-
vantaged social or educational environment, difficult personal
and family situations or circumstances, refugee status, or veteran
status) .'6
The new criteria are intended to help maintain racial diver-
sity without using race as a separate criterion. They do, however,
have another side effect. The new race-blind criteria assist appli-
cants with specific desirable characteristics and do so on an indi-
vidual applicant-by-applicant basis, thus satisfying the Equal
Protection Clause. Because the admissions process will be both
more lengthy and labor intensive it will also be more costly, but if
diversity does indeed constitute a compelling institutional inter-
est, the added costs of achieving true diversity should be well
spent.
168. Office of the Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, Pub. No. 793, Memorandum to General Counsels: Post-Adarand
Guidance on Affirmative Action in Federal Employment (1996).
169. Letter from U.C. President Richard C. Atkinson to the Regents of
the University of California at 4 (March 11, 1996).
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V. IN SUM
In the wake of Hopwood it remains to be seen if the Supreme
Court or other circuit courts will foreclose the diversity rationale
for race-based affirmative action. If diversity remains a possible
justification, it is clear that a level of proof will be mandated and
that diversity will have only a limited use, if any, outside the
higher education context.
Depending on how many circuits adopt the Hopwood court's
interpretation of the Supreme Court's affirmative action juris-
prudence and on the Court's willingness to clarify the interrela-
tionship between Adarand and Bakke, socio-economic "plus"
factors may become the only constitutional approach to create
and maintain diversity in the future. Further, the political mood
may find an increasing number of state universities abandoning
their proaffirmative action policies. Institutions, due to prag-
matic, judicial or legislative mandates, may find their alternatives
limited to recruiting and expanding the pool of minority appli-
cants and expanding admissions and financial aid criteria to
include more indicia of diversity.
No matter how the Supreme Court and the circuit courts
finally interpret the Equal Protection Clause, the use of race as a
proxy for diversity will remain inaccurate. It injures both minori-
ties, by stigmatizing and stereotyping them, and innocent non-
minorities, by sacrificing individual fairness. This is an unaccept-
able result in light of the more accurate and individualized socio-
economic "plus" factor admissions process, a process that can
create and maintain student body diversity without offending the
Constitution or our ethical sensibilities.
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